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1. Introduction 
Investment in the provision of accurate and easily accessible information to 
potential customers has become an important policy instrument for firms in almost all 
industries. Public transport firms -- typically offering scheduled services -- are no 
exception, because better information reduces the generalized cost of public transport 
trips for consumers. This generalized cost includes the fare, the time costs of traveling 
and of waiting at the bus stop or at the rail station (Mohring (1972)), and the schedule 
delay costs associated with arriving earlier or later than desired (Small (1982), Arnott, de 
Palma and Lindsey (1993)). Moreover, it is now generally recognized that it also includes 
the costs of planning the trip (see, e.g., Jansson (1993), De Palma and Lindsey (2001) and 
Fosgerau (2009)). The level of the information provided to passengers when planning 
their trips then affects the generalized cost in two ways. It directly reduces the costs 
associated with planning these trips; indirectly, as it leads more travelers to plan their 
trips, it also saves on passengers‟ overall waiting time costs.  
Although a large literature exists on fares and frequency decisions by public 
transport firms, the role of information provision has not been studied before
1
. In this 
paper, we study the interaction between pricing, frequency of service and information 
provision by public transport firms offering scheduled services, and we do so under 
various regulatory regimes
2
. Four regimes are considered, reflecting different degrees of 
government regulation. First, in line with regulatory policies in some European countries, 
we look at a setting where a price-regulated profit maximizing public transit firm is 
responsible for determining frequency of service and the provision of information, 
conditional on a regulated price imposed by a government agency. The interaction 
between the firm and the government agency is modeled as a leader-follower game with 
the agency acting as the leader. The government sets the fare so as to maximize social 
welfare, taking into account the benefits to users as well as the firm‟s profit. Next we 
                                                 
1
 Of course, there is a large literature on the economics of information in industrial organization. This 
literature studies, among others, the advantages of private information (see, e.g., Einy, Moreno, Shitovitz 
(2002) and Chokler, Hon-Snir, Kim and Shitovitz (2006)), the relation between information acquisition and 
market structure (Dimitrova and Schlee (2003) and Iossa and Staffolini (2002)), the welfare effects of 
ignoring private information (Vives (2002)), and the optimal disclosure of privately held information (see 
Milgrom (2008) for a recent survey)).    
2
With minor qualifications, see section 3.2 below, the model equally applies to bus and railroad companies 
offering scheduled passenger services.  
 2 
study the interaction between pricing, frequency and the provision of information 
assuming that the government agency regulates both fare and the quality of information 
provided to passengers. This is a policy-relevant exercise: although in most countries the 
quality of information is not explicitly regulated, there are notable exceptions. For 
example, in the UK, contracts between the regulatory agency (The Office of Rail 
Regulation) and private railroad operators explicitly impose restrictions on the 
information provided to passengers
3
. Finally, we compare the outcomes under regulation 
with the social optimum and with the outcomes under pure profit maximizing behavior. 
Numerical analysis illustrates the theoretical results. 
Public transport firms typically offer various types of information (e.g., about 
time tables, changes in schedules, or expected delays) through several different channels, 
including websites, information boards on platforms, etc. The main purpose of providing 
high quality information is that this facilitates trip planning by passengers. Of course, the 
cost of providing information can be very substantial, and it increases with the quality of 
information offered. It may involve, for example, designing and maintaining websites, 
providing real-time information about route and schedule changes, etc. The model we 
study below applies to any type of information that is made available by the firm, but 
where passengers incur a cost of learning or extracting the exact information they need. It 
is assumed that this cost is lower for higher quality information. Moreover, the cost to the 
firm of providing the information is assumed to be independent of the number of 
travelers. As an example, think of the information about the time schedules and expected 
delays public transport firms offer on their website. Extracting the required information is 
costly, but the firm can reduce this cost by offering high quality search procedures and 
investing in a user-friendly website; moreover, the cost of providing the information does 
not depend on the number of travelers
4
.  
Our findings may be summarized as follows. First, we show that a fare-regulated 
public transport firm will (conditional on a given fare) provide less frequency and invest 
less in information provision to passengers than is socially optimal. If information and 
                                                 
3
 See the operator licensing information on www.rail-reg.gov.uk.  
4
 As noted by a referee, the assumption that the cost to the firm is independent of the number of passengers 
implies that the model does not apply to all types of information. For example, information provided via 
(printing and distributing) physical booklets is not captured by the model.  
 3 
frequency do not affect the number of planning users, then a higher regulated fare always 
induces the firm to raise both frequency and the quality of information provision. 
However, this is no longer necessarily the case once one accounts for the endogeneity of 
the number of people planning their trips. If providing more information is very effective 
in reducing planning cost, increasing the regulated fare may in fact reduce frequency. 
Similarly, a higher regulated fare may reduce information provision if people attach a 
high value to waiting time, so that offering more frequency is more effective at reducing 
the generalized cost of trips. In general, the firm puts more emphasis on providing more 
information relative to raising frequency if more people plan their trips. Second, if the 
government agency not only regulates the fare but also the quality of information 
provided to passengers, this induces the firm to offer very low frequency. Because of this, 
the welfare improvement due to information regulation is limited. Third, a profit-
maximizing firm offers more information than a fare-regulated firm. Fourth, the 
numerical illustration suggests that delegating all decisions to a profit maximizing firm 
yields frequencies and provision of information that are close to the social optimum, but 
large welfare losses still result due to the high fare. Finally, of all institutional structures 
considered, socially optimal fares and service qualities stimulate passengers least to plan 
their trips: the high frequency offered under the socially optimal policy reduces the 
benefits of trip planning.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly review 
earlier literature on public transport policy-making and the role of information provision.  
In Section 3, we develop the structure of the model, focusing on the introduction of 
information and the cost of planning. Section 4 briefly considers two benchmark cases, 
viz. the social optimum and the maximum profit solution. Fare regulation is dealt with in 
Section 5. We study the behavior of a price-regulated public transport firm that is 
responsible for determining its headway and the level of information provided to users, 
conditional on the price set by government. The fare is determined by the government 
agency taking into account the firm‟s responses to price adjustments. In Section 6 we 
study the case where the government agency not only controls the fare but also imposes 
information requirements on the firm. A comparison of outcomes for price, frequency 
and information provided by the firm is given in Section 7 under the four different 
 4 
scenarios studied: the social optimum, the two regulatory regimes and the profit 
maximum. Numerical analysis illustrates the theoretical outcomes in Section 8. A final 
section summarizes the main findings.   
 
2. Previous literature 
This paper builds upon several strands of literature. First, as providing 
information can be seen as a quality indicator of public transport supply, our model 
relates to the literature on quality and quality regulation originating with the seminal 
paper by Spence (1975). He shows that a profit maximizing monopolist may offer lower 
or higher quality than is socially optimal, depending on the relative quality valuation of 
marginal and infra-marginal consumers (also see Sheshinski (1976)). Moreover, fare 
regulation may provide such firms with incentives to reduce quality (see, for example, 
Sappington and Weisman (1996), and Brueckner (2004)); a variety of policies have been 
designed to mitigate this problem, including revenue-sharing and profit-sharing penalty 
schemes (for further discussion, see Weisman (2005)).  
Second, there is an extensive literature dealing with frequency and pricing 
decisions in the transport sector which has, with very few exceptions, ignored the role of 
information provision
5
. In a seminal paper, Mohring (1972) investigates the 
consequences of scale economies for optimal fares and frequency for urban bus services, 
paying particular attention to the effect of the number of users on waiting time. He 
assumes that the waiting time is proportional to the headway (the time between two 
departures); neither schedule delay costs (costs associated with arriving earlier or later 
than desired) nor planning costs are included in his analysis. His work was extended in 
various directions to capture, among others, optimal vehicle size (Jansson (1980)), the 
role of accident risks (Evans and Morrisson (1997)), and optimal fleet size under capacity 
constraints (Jara-Diaz and Gschwender (2003)). Moreover, Frankena (1981, 1983) 
studied the role of different objective functions of public transit operators and different 
                                                 
5
 De Palma and Lindsey (2001) consider the optimal time table of a firm offering scheduled services under 
fixed demand, and assuming a fixed number of departures over a period of fixed length. Users have linear, 
possibly heterogeneous, scheduling costs. They plan for a specific departure and differ with respect to their 
preferred arrival time. However, the authors do not study the interaction between price, frequency and 
information provision. 
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government subsidy formulas for optimal pricing and frequency decisions. Finally, a 
number of papers have explicitly taken into account competition from other transport 
modes. For example, Viton (1983) determines optimal modal composition in the peak 
period, using car and bus prices, the supply of highway lanes, and service characteristics 
of public transport (routes, frequency per route per hour) as policy variables. Similarly, 
Kraus (1989) developed a simulation model to study optimal pricing of car and bus use 
together with optimal frequency provision by the public bus mode, focusing on the 
relative efficiency of different pricing instruments in the presence of un-priced road 
congestion. De Borger and Wouters (1998) introduce optimal frequency and fleet size 
into a model of optimal pricing of transport services in the presence of congestion. Most 
recently, Bilotkach, Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2010) consider the differential behavior of 
scheduled service providers in terms of pricing and frequency decisions, depending on 
the distance of the service route and whether they face a competing mode.   
 Third, the literature on pricing and frequency decisions surveyed above typically 
ignored schedule delay costs due to undesirable arrival times; moreover, it implicitly 
focused on users who are not planning their trips, in the sense that they randomly arrive at 
the place of departure. This may be realistic for very frequent services. If people do not 
plan their trips then, in the worst case, if they arrive immediately after a departure they 
have to wait for a length of time equal to the headway, the time between two departures. 
However, for less frequent services (air service, many rail and bus services) or for 
frequent users of a particular service, it is more plausible that people do not arrive 
randomly but plan their arrivals at the place of departure (by consulting time tables before 
heading for the station, etc.). This paper also extends a small literature initiated by Panzar 
(1979), who introduced schedule delay costs and planning users in a model of optimal 
airline frequency and ticket price. Combining the cases of planning and non-planning 
users, Jansson (1993) analyzed the socially optimal choice of fare and service frequency. 
To distinguish users who plan from those who do not, he included a fixed cost of 
planning a trip, the same for everyone. Most recently, Fosgerau (2009) allows more 
flexibility, assuming a distribution for the cost of planning (which may be very different 
for trips an individual makes very frequently compared to trips that are not frequently 
made). The model implies a smooth transition between the two cases (planning and non-
 6 
planning users) as headway increases. The author uses the model to determine the 
marginal cost of headway, but he does not study the implications of planning for optimal 
pricing and frequencies, nor does he analyze the effects of providing better information 
and the optimal investment in information. 
 
3. Structure of the model 
 In this section, we present the structure of the model. Given the focus on 
information provision, we consider a single bus or rail line throughout and ignore many 
of the other complications considered in the literature (optimal vehicle size, optimal fleet 
size, etc.). A crucial ingredient of the model is that it allows for planned and unplanned 
trips, endogenously determining the number of planned trips as a function of the 
frequency and information provided by the public transport firm
6
.  
 
3.1. Generalized costs for planned and non-planned trips 
We assume that travelers can plan their trips or just go to the bus stop or rail 
station at random. To make the distinction as transparent as possible, we assume that 
planning users incur planning costs but do not incur waiting time at the stop. Users who 
do not plan a particular trip have no planning costs but incur waiting time costs
7
. 
Moreover, both planning and non-planning travelers pay the fare, and they incur schedule 
delay costs associated with deviations between the scheduled arrival time and their 
preferred arrival time. The cost of travel time is ignored, because it is unaffected by the 
policy variables studied in this paper.   
First, consider schedule delay costs. In order to focus on the trade-off between 
waiting time costs and planning costs, we keep the specification of schedule delay costs 
                                                 
6
 In principle, the firm may direct different types of information towards different types of passengers. For 
example, users that plan their trips ex ante may benefit substantially from a high-quality website. 
Passengers not planning their trips ex ante do not benefit from this type of information, but they may 
benefit from information boards at the bus or rail stop. In the paper, we do not explicitly distinguish 
different types of information.  
7
 This setup implies that the model is best suited to describe the case of ex ante trip planning using, for 
example, information made available on websites. However, with minor adjustment it can also deal with 
information provided at stops. What is crucial in our model is the trade-off between planning costs and the 
costs of waiting. Although improving the quality of information boards or electronic announcements of 
delays at stops and stations does not reduce waiting time, it facilitates planning the remainder of the trip 
and reduces the cost of waiting time, allowing passengers to use waiting times more efficiently. 
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as simple as possible. If the costs of being early or late are linear in time, and assuming 
the preferred arrival times are uniformly distributed over time, it can be shown that 
expected schedule delay costs of planning and non-planning users are equal (Fosgerau 
(2009)). Moreover, under these conditions this expected scheduling cost is linear in 
headway (de Palma and Lindsey (2001), Fosgerau (2009)). Since the focus of this paper 
is on information provision we will stick to these assumptions. Denote the headway 
offered by the firm on the bus or rail line under consideration as h. This allows us to 
assume that, both for planning and non-planning users, the expected schedule delay cost 
is just given by  
h ,  
where  depends on the costs of arriving early and late. Raising headway (reducing 
frequency) increases the cost of schedule delay.  
Next consider the costs of waiting time at the stop and the cost of planning trips. 
Whether or not people plan a particular trip depends on the relative costs of the two 
options. We assume that not planning implies that the expected waiting time public 
transport users incur is half the headway; denoting the waiting cost per time unit as  , 
the expected value of this cost is therefore 
2
h
. Of course, planning is costly as well. The 
cost of planning for an individual is specified as  
( , )I   0; 0I          (1) 
The planning cost depends on the quality of information, denoted I, provided by the firm. 
Better information (quality and user-friendliness of timetables, availability of information 
on different platforms, availability and quality of trip planning websites, how the firm 
deals with unexpected changes in schedules, with unforeseen delays, etc.) reduces 
planning costs for all passengers. However, dealing with the information provided by the 
firm requires time and effort on the part of the passenger. This is captured by an 
individual-specific parameter   that reflects the effort it takes the individual to collect 
the required trip information from the supply of information provided by the firm (going 
on the web, looking up timetables, checking whether the trip is not subject to unexpected 
delays, etc). To a large extent, it represents the individual‟s “efficiency” in getting the 
information he is interested in. For a particular trip, it may differ substantially across 
 8 
users depending on, among others, hardware and software available, on the person‟s 
familiarity with using modern technology, etc. One expects the effort to collect 
information also to depend on whether the individual makes the trip frequently or not. For 
example, for trips made very often it is unnecessary to check the timetable but it suffices 
to check for delays. Looking up information requires relatively more effort for trips not 
frequently made.  
The above discussion then implies that the generalized cost of a trip for an 
individual depends on whether he is planning the trip or not. If the user does not plan, the 
generalized cost consists of the fare (denoted as p), the schedule delay cost and the 
waiting time cost at the stop 
.
2
h
p h

 
         
(2) 
In the case a user does plan a particular trip, the generalized cost of this trip is the fare 
plus the schedule delay cost plus the individual specific effort cost 
 
( , ).p h I            
(3) 
 
3.2. The decision whether or not to plan 
Consider the decision of a rational individual user who has to decide whether to 
plan the trip or not. Given his individual „effort‟ parameter  , he will plan if the cost of 
doing so is less than the cost of not planning. So this person plans as long as
8
  
( , ) .
2
h
I

            (4) 
Denote the solution of ( , )
2
h
I

    for  by ( , )
2
h
k I

. It follows that the person will 
plan as long as 
 , .
2
h
k I


 
  
 
        (5) 
The function (.)k can be interpreted as the maximum effort level the individual is willing 
to incur to plan his trip. It follows from the definition that 
                                                 
8
 Note that we could use the same model to allow a distribution of time values in a setting without 
individual-specific planning cost. A cutoff for the time value would then determine whether an individual 
would be planning or not.   
 9 
( , ) .
2
h
k I

           (6) 
The implicit function theorem then implies 
  0; 0.
2
Ik k
h I 

 
 
    
 
    
                 (7) 
Raising the headway (reducing frequency) or raising the level of information provided by 
the firm increases the maximal effort the individual is willing to incur to plan trips.  
Following Fosgerau (2009), assume that the distribution of the individual-specific 
planning cost parameter  has support on an interval ( ,   ) such that nobody plans for 
( , )
2
h
k I

   and everyone plans when ( , )
2
h
k I

  . The intuition for this 
assumption is clear. For example, suppose the headway offered is below a particular very 
low threshold. Then it seems reasonable that nobody will plan, no matter how much 
information is provided. Indeed, at very high frequency planning is simply unnecessary
9
. 
Alternatively, suppose frequency is very low; then a user who is not planning his trip will 
incur extremely long average waiting times, and hence it seems reasonable to assume that 
everyone will plan.  
The fraction of all users who will plan their trips (or the probability that an 
arbitrary user plans) can be written as 
( , )
2
( , ) ( ) .
2
h
k I
h
k I d



  

 
  
 
        (8) 
where   is the density function. We find by differentiating (8) that 
0; 0.
2
I
h I 

 
 
 
    
 
 
     (9) 
The number of planning users rises when headway goes up (higher headway or lower 
frequency raises the benefits of planning) and when better information is provided. 
Moreover, (8) also means that more people plan when the waiting time cost  increases: 
this makes planning more beneficial. 
 
                                                 
9
 Note that this assumption may be slightly less realistic for rail than for bus service. In large rail stations, 
even at high frequencies some planning is necessary, as passengers have to find out on what platform the 
train arrives and, in some cases, which car to board.    
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3.3. The specification of total trip demand  
The specification of the demand side of the model is kept simple. Travelers differ 
in planning efficiency, captured by the individual-specific parameter  ; otherwise, they 
are identical. The generalized cost is, conditional on  , given by (2) or (3) above. 
Moreover, travel demand is assumed to be linear in the generalized price of trips. Given 
these assumptions, it is straightforward to show that total expected demand for bus trips 
becomes linear in the expected generalized cost of trips.
10
 Specifically, aggregate demand 
N(.) can be written as (see Appendix 1)  
 ( , ) ; ' 0, " 0N p f h I N N         (10) 
where  
 
( , )
2
( , ) 1 ( , ) ( , ) ( ) .
2 2
h
k I
h h
f h I h k I I d


 
     

  
       
   (11) 
Note that  ( , )p f I h is the expected generalized cost across all planning and non- 
planning users. The function f(h,I) is the expected non-monetary component of the 
generalized cost of the trip. It consists of the expected schedule delay plus waiting (for 
non-planning users) and planning (for people planning their trips) cost. The first term is 
schedule delay cost, the second term is the waiting time cost for users who do not plan. 
Indeed, 
2
h
 is the average waiting time cost for an un-planning user, and the number of 
such users equals 1 ,
2
h
k I
  
   
  
. The third term on the right hand side is the expected 
planning cost of planning users.  
To analyze the effect of the policy variables on demand, it is instructive to derive 
the impact of changes in headway and the level of information provision on f(.). This is 
obtained by differentiating (11). We find after simple algebra that 
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 Linearity will prove to strongly facilitate the derivations; it does not affect the qualitative nature of our 
findings. 
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 
( , )
2
1 (.) 0,
2
( ) ( , ) 0.
h
k I
I
f
h
f
I d
I




    


   


 
 
                (12) 
Here, the last inequality follows from ( , ) 0I I    (see (1) above). Expression (12) 
implies that increasing the headway (lower frequency) increases the overall expected cost 
of a trip. This effect is decreasing in the number of planning users. Higher frequency 
reduces the cost of planning, because scheduling costs and waiting time costs of un-
planning users decline; this effect is smaller when more people plan because the fraction 
of un-planning people is lower. Similarly, providing more information reduces the cost of 
planning, and it does so more when more people plan. 
 Using (12) and (10), it then follows that the impact of the three policy instruments 
of interest on demand is given by 
     ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
' 0; ' 0; ' 0
N p f h I N p f h I N p f h If f
N N N
p h h I I
      
     
    
As expected, increasing the fare reduces demand, more frequency and better information 
both raise demand
11
. 
 
 3.4. Costs of headway and information 
The firm incurs costs of running the scheduled service; moreover, providing 
information to potential passengers is costly. Fixed costs are ignored; they do not affect 
the results. It is assumed that the cost of running a bus is constant and equal to c, so that 
total running costs for a given headway h amount to  
.
c
h
 
The costs associated with providing a level of information I are captured by ( ) 0g I  , 
where (0) 0g  , and g’>0, g”>0. Better information is costly at an increasing rate. Note 
that the cost is assumed to be independent of the number of users. As noted above, this 
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 Our model implies that the provision of information affects consumer choices. There is substantial recent 
evidence that this is indeed the case (Farag and Lyons (2010), Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2011)). Specifically 
for the problem studied in this paper, evidence suggests that users acquire public transport information 
more intensively for unfamiliar trips, for arrival-time sensitive trips, long distance trips, and for leisure trips 
(Farag and Lyons (2010)).  
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implies that the model does not capture information provision (for example, of 
timetables) via physical booklets.     
In view of this discussion, the firm‟s operational profit can be written as 
  ( , , ) ( , ) ( ).
c
p h I pN p f h I g I
h
          (13) 
 
4. Benchmark cases: the social optimum and pure profit maximizing behavior  
Before proceeding to the analysis of regulated markets, in this section we first 
briefly study two special cases. At one extreme, we look at the fare, frequency and 
quality of information that would be provided by a welfare-maximizing government 
agency. At the other extreme, we consider the choices of the policy variables that would 
be made by a profit-maximizing unregulated monopolist. Both cases serve as benchmarks 
for the regulatory settings considered further in the paper. 
 
4.1. Perfect government control and the social optimum 
Consider a government agency that controls all three decision variables. Assume 
the agency maximizes the following social welfare function 
 
( , )
( ) ( , ) ( )
p f h I
c
W N s ds p N p f h I g I
h



   
           

  
   (14) 
The first component of the welfare function is net consumer surplus, the second term is 
the profit of the firm, weighted by a parameter  reflecting the social value the 
government assigns to the firm‟s operating profit or deficit. The first-order conditions are 
 ( 1) ' 0
W
N pN
p
 

   

         (15a) 
2
' 0
W f f c
N pN
h h h h

   
        
         (15b) 
' ' 0
W f f
N pN g
I I I

   
        
                      (15c) 
Using (15a) in (15b)-(15c), the system can be rewritten as
   
(1 )
'
N
p
N



            (16a) 
 13 
2
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N
h h



            (16b)
 
'
f
N g
I

 

                       (16c) 
         
The welfare-optimal price depends on the social value of profits and on the price 
sensitivity of demand. If 1  , we obtain the first-best outcome. Not surprisingly, as the 
production cost is independent of the number of passengers (it only depends on 
frequency) and there are neither external costs nor benefits in the model, this implies a 
zero fare. For higher values of  , the government charges a positive fare to users. The 
expressions for optimal headway and information provision simply require equality of the 
marginal benefits to users (left-hand side) and the marginal cost to the firm (right-hand 
side).  
 
4.2. Behavior of a profit-maximizing unregulated monopolist  
 How would a pure profit-maximizing firm set the fare, the headway and the level 
of information provided to passengers? Denoting profit by  , the firm maximizes  
  ( , ) ( )
c
p N p f h I g I
h
           (17) 
with respect to p,h and I . This implies the first-order conditions 
 ' 0p pN N
p



   

  
     (18a) 
2
' 0h
f c
pN
h h h


 
   
 
       (18b) 
' ' 0I
f
pN g
I I


 
   
 
       (18c) 
Using (18a) in (18b)-(18c) and rearranging, we find 
 
'
N
p
N
           (19a) 
2
f c
N
h h



         (19b) 
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I

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
         (19c) 
The monopolist charges a fare consistent with a unitary price elasticity of demand. 
Moreover, it equates the firm‟s marginal revenues and marginal costs, both for headway 
and information provision.  
Comparing systems (19) and (16) reproduces two well-known results. First, 
conditional on an arbitrary fare, optimal frequency and quality of information are 
identical at the social optimum and at the profit-maximizing outcome
12
. Second, if the 
weight on profit   is infinitely large, the social optimum and the profit-maximizing 
solution coincide. 
 
 
5. Fare regulation 
In this section, we assume that the public transport firm operates in a regulated 
environment in which the price is imposed by a supervising public agency. Conditional 
on the price, the firm can freely set the headway and determine the quality of information 
it provides to facilitate trip planning of passengers so as to maximize its operating profit. 
Both reduction in headway (increase in frequency) and increased information provision 
on its schedules are costly to the firm. 
Of course, the interaction between the government and the firm can be modeled in 
different ways. The most plausible setting seems to be a leader-follower framework in 
which the government agency acts as the leader by making the first move. The agency 
first sets the fare to be charged by the public transport firm; conditional on the fare, the 
firm decides on frequency and the quality of information offered to passengers. When 
fixing the fare, the agency takes into account how the firm will respond to different fare 
levels
13
.  
                                                 
12
 Although he assumes fixed demand rather than a given price, this result is consistent with Spence (1975) 
who shows that if marginal and infra-marginal consumers value quality equally, the profit-maximizing and 
socially optimal quality levels are identical. Also see Oum, Zhang and Zhang (2004) and De Borger and 
Van Dender (2006) for similar findings in different types of models.  
13
 In a previous version of the paper, we also considered a Nash game between the government agency and 
the firm. As noted by a referee, a leader-follower setting seems more realistic than a Nash game: it seems 
plausible that the fare is known to the firm when it makes its decisions on frequency and information. In a 
Nash game, we found that, if the firm raises headway (reduces frequency) and, as a consequence, reduces 
demand, the government reacts by lowering the fare so as to stimulate demand. If the firm provides more 
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Although the contract specifications governing the relations between public 
transport firms and the regulating agencies are highly complex in practice, the setting 
studied in this section does serve as a highly stylized description of the authority division 
between public transit firms and the government in a number of European countries
14
. In 
what follows, we solve the leader-follower game backwards: we first look at the 
decisions of the firm, then consider fare determination by the government agency. 
 
5.1. Frequency and information provision by a price-regulated firm  
 In this section, we study the implications of fare regulation for the frequency of 
service and for the quality of information the firm provides to passengers. We also want 
to find out how the firm reacts to changes in the fare imposed by the government agency.  
The firm maximizes profit, given by (17), with respect to h and I, conditional on 
the regulated fare p. Of course, this just gives the first-order conditions that were reported 
before, see expressions (18b)-(18c). It then immediately follows that, for a given fare, the 
firm will provide less frequency and less information than a welfare-maximizing 
government. To see this, substitute (18b)-(18c) in (15b)-(15c) to find 
 0
W f
N
h h
 
  
 
        (20a) 
0
W f
N
I I
 
  
 
        (20b)  
This says that, at the profit-maximizing values for headway and level of information 
provision by the bus company, a further increase in frequency and information would be 
welfare-increasing. This gives the following proposition.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
information, the government raises the fare. In other words, the government agency „punishes‟ the firm for 
reducing frequency or offering less information by reducing the fare. 
14
 There is little doubt that the government agency makes the first move in almost all European countries. 
Often, but not always, this happens by auctioning the right to provide public transport service under pre-
specified regulatory conditions. Moreover, in several countries (including Belgium and Denmark) fare 
regulation seems to be an acceptable approximation to the complex contracts between government agencies 
and public transport operators; the contracts  either explicitly stipulate fares to be charged or impose strong 
restrictions on fare adjustments during the term of the contract, but they do allow some flexibility in 
scheduling and information provision. However, not all regulatory settings fit our model description. For 
example, although in France more than two thirds of all operators are private firms, most decisions on fares, 
routes and schedules are taken by local government authorities under fixed price or cost-plus contracts. For 
a detailed description of the French system, see Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002).     
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Proposition 1: Conditional on the regulated fare imposed, the firm will provide less 
frequency and invest less in information provision to passengers compared to the welfare 
optimum. 
 
This finding is just a minor extension of a well-known result derived by, among others, 
Brueckner (2004). Within the context of competition between airlines, he shows that 
price-regulated firms will provide lower service quality
15
. Proposition 1 above shows that 
this finding holds for both frequency and the quality of information provision. The 
intuition is clear. The profit-maximizing firm ignores the effect of its frequency and 
information decisions on net consumer surplus (see the first term of the welfare function 
in (14) above). The reason it ignores these benefits is that it cannot recoup the costs by 
raising the fare. Ignoring the extra benefits, it provides both insufficient frequency and 
information.   
Now turn to the question of how the firm reacts to an increase in the regulated 
fare. We derive the effect of a higher regulated fare on the headway and the information 
provided by the public transport firm in Appendix 2. Unfortunately, the sign and 
magnitude of these effects depend in a complex way on the price sensitivity of demand, 
on the distribution of  , on the planning cost function ( , )I  , on the cost of operating 
buses, and on the shape of the information cost function ( )g I . It will be instructive, 
therefore, to start with some special cases.  
First, if no one plans, we find (see Appendix 2) that a higher price reduces 
headway (hence raises frequency) but does not have any effect on information. This is 
intuitive. The firm raises frequency because this reduces the generalized price of a trip 
and, hence, it stimulates demand. However, the impact on information provision is zero; 
information is costly but does not yield benefits when no one plans. Second, if everyone 
plans, we find (see Appendix 2) that a higher fare reduces headway (raises frequency) 
and raises information provision. Again, this is plausible. Even though providing more 
information does not increase the number of people that plan their trips, it does reduce the 
generalized cost of a trip for all passengers, and it therefore stimulates demand. 
                                                 
15
 See his Proposition 6. A similar result was also derived in a different context by Bilotkach et al. (2010, p. 
65-66). 
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In between zero and universal planning there is a smooth transition from fewer to 
more planners. To facilitate the interpretation of the general case, it is instructive to 
assume a linear individual information cost function ( , )h I . In Appendix 2, we show 
that the effect of the fare on headway and information is given by the following 
expressions  
 
'
" (1 )
2
dh N
g Z
dp D I


  
     
  
      (21) 
  3
' 2
I
dI N c
Z
dp D h h

 
  
         
(22) 
where  
  ' 0;
2
I hh II hI IhZ pN D

     
  
      
  
    (23) 
These results can be interpreted as follows. If offering more frequency and better 
information did not affect the number of planners ( 0
h I
 
 
 
), then a higher 
regulated fare would induce the firm to reduce headway and increase information. 
Indeed, in that case
 
 
'
" 1 0
2
dh N
g
dp D


  
     
  
        
 
3
' 2
0.I
dI N c
dp D h

 
   
 
       
  
Note that a higher cost c of operating extra buses means that a fare increase will imply 
more investment in information provision (rather than offering more frequency). Not 
surprisingly, a larger number of planners   means that the firm puts more emphasis on 
providing more information relative to raising frequency.  
If information does raise the number of planners, (21) suggests that a fare increase 
leads to less extra frequency (note that N’<0, Z>0). The intuition is that when more 
passengers are planning their trips, this makes increasing frequency less beneficial to the 
firm, so it puts less emphasis on raising frequency. If the impact of information on 
planning is large, the final term between brackets in (21) may dominate so that the firm 
may even reduce frequency. Similarly, expression (22) implies that if headway raises the 
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number of people that are planning their trips then the firm provides less extra 
information after a fare increase. Indeed, offering more frequency reduces the number of 
planners, making information less useful. If planning is strongly affected by headway the 
firm may actually reduce information provision.    
Slightly rewriting (21)-(22) also shows that the effect of the fare on information 
and headway crucially depends on the relative importance of the value of waiting time  
( ) and on the impact information has on passengers‟ costs of planning (as captured by 
I ). Using (9) we can reformulate (21)-(22) as
 
   
'
" 1 (.)
2
I
dh N
G g
dp D

 
  
     
  
      (24) 
   3
' 2
2
I
dI N c
G
dp D h


  
    
  
     
  (25) 
where   
  ' 0.
2
IG pN


 

 
   
 
 
If the value of waiting time ( ) is large relative to the effect of information on planning 
cost ( I ), the firm puts much more emphasis on having more frequency. If, on the 
contrary, waiting time is not important but the firm‟s information provision has a large 
effect on individuals‟ planning costs, then more attention goes to raising information. It is 
also clear from (24)-(25) that a higher fare may well reduce frequency or information 
provision. For example, if time values are very high and information is ineffective in 
reducing planning costs, then the firm reacts to a higher fare by strongly raising 
frequency and in fact reducing information provision.  
We summarize our findings on the effect of the fare in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: (a) If the number of people planning their trips is constant, then a fare 
increase raises both frequency and information provision. (b) The firm puts more 
emphasis on providing more information relative to raising frequency if more people 
plan their trips. (c) If the number of planners depends on the frequency offered and the 
information provided by the firm, higher fares may reduce frequency or information 
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provision. Higher fares reduce frequency when providing more information is very 
effective in reducing planning cost. Similarly, if time values are sufficiently high, a fare 
increase leads the firm to provide less information.  
 
 Finally, in Appendix 3 we show that a higher cost of operating a public transport 
trip (a larger c) raises headway (and, hence, reduces frequency); moreover, it increases 
optimal information provision by the firm. We have  
 0; 0.
dh dI
dc dc
            
 
Proposition 3: An increase in the cost of offering public transport service implies that 
the firm offers more information and less frequency.  
 
5.2.The pricing decision of the government agency 
 When deciding on the price to impose on the public transport operator, the 
government takes account of the firm‟s response to the fare when it determines 
information provision and frequency offered. As argued in Section 4, we assume the 
agency cares about both the net surplus of users and the profit of the firm. It solves 
  
( , )
max ( ) ( , ) ( ) .
p
p f h I
c
W N s ds pN p f h I g I
h



   
           
  
Let us denote the responses of the public transport firm to the regulated fare by writing 
( ), ( )h p I p , where the derivatives 
( ) ( )
,
dh p dI p
dp dp
have been determined in the previous 
section, see (21) and (22). The fare will therefore affect welfare directly, but also 
indirectly via the adjustment of headway and information investment. 
The first-order condition of the government‟s problem is 
 
( ) ( )dW W W dh p W dI p
dp p h dp I dp
  
  
  
=0.         (26) 
The first term is the welfare effect of a price increase at given frequency and information 
levels. The second and third terms capture the induced welfare effect by the firm‟s 
reaction to price changes. Expression (26) shows that the government „corrects‟ the 
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firm‟s profit maximizing behavior with respect to headway and information provision by 
adjusting the fare.  
Using (15a) and (20a)-(20b) in (26), straightforward algebra shows:  
                     
(1 ) ( ) ( )
.
' '
N N f dh p f dI p
p
N N h dp I dp

 
   
   
  
    (27) 
The first term on the right hand side is the expression for the welfare optimal price, 
provided the government controlled all policy variables (see (16a)). The sign of the 
„correction‟ term  
 
( ) ( )
'
N f dh p f dI p
N h dp I dp
  
 
  
 
is indeterminate in general and depends on the signs of the reaction functions of the firm. 
If higher fares raise frequency and information provision then the correction term is 
positive. This leads to an optimal price that is “structurally” higher than the welfare 
optimal price. This makes sense: the higher fare induces the firm to offer more frequency 
and better information, both of which were under-provided. Of course, as argued above, 
in particular circumstances a higher fare may reduce frequency and/or information 
quality; in those cases, the last term on the right hand side of (27) may be negative.  
 
6. Fare and information regulation 
 In this section, we study the case where the government agency regulates both the 
fare and the quality of information provision. There are good reasons for analyzing this 
case. First, the theory presented in the previous section suggested that, conditional on the 
fare, the firm provides insufficient information from a social viewpoint. Although the 
government agency adjusts the fare to take the firm‟s responses into account, the result 
may well be that fare regulation results in low information quality. Imposing restrictions 
on information provision (for example, requiring time tables in a particular format, 
requiring specific information on platforms, quality of websites etc.) may then be a useful 
instrument to mitigate this tendency to provide low-quality information
16
. Not 
                                                 
16
 As an analogy, in several industries regulators have imposed quality restrictions combined with penalty 
schemes if firms do not comply (Weisman (2005)).   
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surprisingly, at least some European public transport regulators (for example, the UK) do 
impose such minimum quality restrictions. Second, we are interested in the implications 
of regulating information provision for welfare and for the other major decisions 
variables in the public transport sector, i.e., fares and frequency
17
.   
 
6.1. The firm‟s frequency decision  
The first-order condition for profit-maximizing headway was derived before (see 
(18b); it is reproduced here for convenience 
 
2
' 0h
f c
pN
h h h


 
   
 
       (28) 
Substituting (28) in (15b), it again immediately follows that, conditional on the regulated 
fare and information quality, the firm underprovides frequency compared to the socially 
optimal level.  
Differentiating (28), and maintaining our assumption of linear demand, we find 
2 2
2 3
2
' ' ' 0
f c f f
pN dh N dp pN dI
h h h h I
      
                
The first term between square brackets is negative by the second-order condition, so we 
have
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A higher regulated fare now unambiguously (i.e., independent of the impact on the 
number of planners) leads the firm to raise frequency. Not surprisingly, the requirement 
                                                 
17
 We also briefly considered the case where the government agency regulates the quality of information 
but leaves decisions on both fare and frequency to the firm. The impact of higher standards for the quality 
of information has ambiguous effects on fares and frequency: if the value of time is small but information 
strongly reduces planning costs then requiring higher information quality reduces frequency as well as 
fares; if time values are high and information is not successful in reducing generalized cost, then better 
information raises frequency and raises fares. How much information the government agency imposes upon 
the firm further depends on the relative cost of operating trips and the price sensitivity of demand. It may be 
above or below the socially optimal level.         
18
 The sign of the second expression follows from 
2 f
h I

 
<0; this is easily shown by differentiating (12). 
Also see Appendix 2.  
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to provide better information raises headway and hence reduces frequency: one quality 
attribute is substituted for another.  
 
6.2. The agency‟s decision: fare and information provision 
The government sets fare and information provision, taking into account the 
reaction by the firm. It solves 
 
,
( , )
max ( ) ( , ) ( ) .
p I
p f h I
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W N s ds pN p f h I g I
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As shown above, the firm‟s optimal headway depends on the regulated fare and 
information quality. We write h(p,I) , where the relevant derivatives are given by (29).   
The first-order conditions with respect to p and I are given by, respectively 
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where we reproduce earlier results for convenience:  
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Note that in (32b) we used the first-order condition for profit maximizing choice of 
headway. Use (32a)-(32b) in (30) to find: 
(1 )
.
' '
N N f dh
p
N N h dp

 
  
   
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      (33) 
Then substitute (32b)-(32c) in (31) and use (33). We obtain: 
' 0
dW f f f dh dh
N g N
dI I h I dp dI

    
            
.    (34) 
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Expressions (33)-(34) capture the government agency‟s behavior when setting 
fares and the quality of information imposed on the firm. If neither the fare nor the 
quality of information had any impact on the firm‟s choice of headway ( 0
dh dh
dp dI
  ), 
then we just reproduce the social optimum (see system (16)). If headway choices do 
depend on the government‟s regulated fares and information quality, using our previous 
results (more precisely 0, 0
f dh
h dp

 

) in (33) imply that the fare structurally exceeds the 
socially optimal fare. Moreover, as the sign of the final term between square brackets in 
(34) is ambiguous, this expression suggests that, conditional on fare and frequency, the 
government agency‟s choice of information quality may be higher or lower than socially 
optimal.  
The economic intuition underlying (33)-(34) can best be illustrated by considering 
some simplifying examples. Suppose that the public transport firm strongly raises 
frequency after an increase in the regulated fare (
dh
dp
 large in absolute value), but that it 
does not substantially reduce frequency when more stringent information requirements 
are imposed (
dh
dI
small). Then (33)-(34) jointly imply a relatively high fare and high 
quality of information. The high fare strongly stimulates the firm to offer more frequency 
but it also raises generalized prices for passengers; offering high quality information 
dampens this increase in generalized price while – under our assumptions – not affecting 
frequency much. Alternatively, suppose that exactly the opposite assumptions hold (
dh
dp
small, 
dh
dI
large). Then (33)-(34) imply low fares and poor information quality. The 
former yields low generalized prices but it does not stimulate more frequent service 
provision by the firm; therefore, frequency is stimulated by providing relatively low 
quality information.        
 We summarize our findings in this section in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 4.  Suppose the government agency regulates both the fare and the quality of 
information the public transport firm has to provide to passengers. Then  
(a) Imposing more stringent restrictions on the quality of information unambiguously 
reduces the frequency offered by the firm.   
(b) The regulated fare structurally exceeds the socially optimal value 
(c) The quality of information offered to passengers may be better than socially 
optimal  
 
7. Comparing different institutional settings 
   In the previous sections we analyzed fares, frequency and the quality of 
information provided to passengers under different regulatory regimes. In order of 
increasingly more stringent regulation we looked at pure profit maximizing behavior, fare 
regulation, fare plus information regulation, and full government control (the social 
optimum). For each of the four regulatory structures considered, the outcomes for the 
policy variables can be described as the solution to a system of three simultaneous 
equations. In Table 1 we summarize the various equation systems.  
Of course, comparing sets of simultaneous equations does not give unambiguous 
predictions for comparison of numerical outcomes, because demand and several of the 
derivatives occurring in the different expressions depend on all policy variables. 
Numerical analysis is needed to get insight into the implications of different regulatory 
regimes for optimal information provision, frequency and fares. Based on our earlier 
discussion and on Table 1, there are just a few speculative observations we can make.  
First, compare the social optimum with decisions by a fully profit-maximizing 
firm. As argued before, conditional on the price, the social optimum and the maximum 
profit solution yield the same headway and information provision. Of course, for 
reasonable values of the cost of funds, Table 1 suggests a much lower price at the social 
optimum. Lower fares raise demand, suggesting higher frequency and information 
provision at the social optimum. Second, by the same arguments we expect higher fares 
and both lower frequency and information quality under fare regulation as compared to 
the social optimum. Third, although the comparison is ambiguous theoretically, we 
expect higher quality information and lower frequency under fare plus information 
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regulation compared to fare regulation only; the effect on fares is unclear a priori. Finally, 
whether fare plus information regulation will lead to better information than the social 
optimum is ambiguous, although in the former case we expect much lower frequency.      
  
Table 1: Comparing optimality rules 
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8. A numerical example 
 
In this section, we provide a simple numerical example to illustrate our findings. 
We first present the functional forms chosen for the demand function, the planning cost 
function and the information cost function; we explain our choice of distribution for the 
individual-specific planning cost parameter , and we describe the parameter values 
used. We then discuss the numerical results and look at some sensitivity results.  
 
8.1. Choice of functional forms and parameters 
The demand function is taken to be linear 
   ( , ) ( , ) .N p f h I a b p f h I     
The planning cost function takes the following simple form
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The cost is increasing in the individual-specific parameter  and declining in 
information. Note that this specification implies ,
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information, the scheduling plus planning cost f(h,I) can be written as  
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The information cost function was specified as 
1
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g Ig I g e g g    
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     
2
1 1( ) 0; ' ( ) 0; " ( ) 0.g I g g g I g g g I      
Finally, we let the individual cost parameter   be gamma distributed with 
parameters ,s  ; specifically 
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 Note that we avoided a linear specification as this may easily lead to negative overall planning costs. A 
desirable characteristic of the specification used is that it is the simplest form that avoids negative planning 
costs. 
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The gamma distribution was chosen because it is naturally positive. Moreover, ( )    is 
easily integrated, which facilitates the numerical implementation.  
The parameters chosen for the various functions are summarized in Table 2, 
including the „cost of funds‟ parameter 1.2   used in the simulations.  
 
 
Demand 
function 
Cost of 
bus 
service 
Scheduling 
cost 
Information 
cost function 
Distribution 
of   
Cost of 
funds 
      
a=2 c=2 0.8   
0 0.1g   s=1 1.2   
b=0.1  0.16   
1 0.1g   1    
      
Table 2. Parameter values for the numerical illustration 
 
 
 8.2. Numerical results 
 
We numerically studied the behavior of the government and the public transport 
firm under the four regimes analyzed above. The results are summarized in Table 3.  
First, consistent with the theory of the previous sections, the social optimum 
yields somewhat lower headway (more frequency) and better information provision, but a 
much lower fare as compared to the profit maximizing solution. Second, imposing a 
regulated fare and making the firm responsible for frequency and information provision 
only is welfare-improving compared to the maximum profit scenario, but the lower fare 
does induce the firm to offer less frequency and reduce information provision. Third,  
combining information requirements with fare regulation strongly increases information 
provision, but does so at the expense of lower frequency: the government forces the firm 
to provide more information, but the firm reacts by saving on another quality aspect, viz. 
frequency. Fourth, a profit maximizing firm controlling all policy variables invests more 
in information to passengers than a fare regulated firm. Finally, interestingly, the social 
optimum implies the lowest fraction of planning users; this holds because of the very 
high frequency, which reduces the benefits of planning trips, and despite more 
information being provided.  
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 No 
regulation: 
Profit Max 
Fare 
regulation 
Fare and 
information 
regulation 
Social 
optimum 
     
Fare (p) 9.46 4.31 3.97 2.74 
Headway (h) 2.90 4.69 5.50 2.04 
Information (I) 1.27 1.09 1.86 1.36 
Fraction of people planning ( ) 0.77 0.87 0.98 0.67 
Demand (N) 0.95 1.41 1.46 1.64 
Scheduling cost f(h,I) 1.07 1.55 1.41 0.82 
Information cost g(I) 0.16 0.12 0.35 0.18 
Profit  8.11 5.54 5.09 3.34 
Welfare 14.21 16.66 16.80 17.52 
Table 3. Results under different institutional settings 
 
 
 
 The results are obviously sensitive to the parameters of the problem (time values, 
cost of bus service, price sensitivity of demand, etc.). In Table 4, for example, we 
consider the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumed value of time. We 
compare the results for a low time value (half the base value) with the base value (equal 
to 0.8, as used in Table 3) and a high value (twice the base value). For each type of 
market structure, we report the most important outcomes in Table 4. To facilitate 
comparison, the base results of Table 3 are indicated in bold in Table 4. 
We observe that higher value of time induces more people to plan in order to 
avoid waiting time costs at the bus stop. Not surprisingly, having more planners then 
makes it worthwhile for the firm to provide more information. It also implies that 
headway rises and, hence, frequency goes down; given the specification of the model, 
offering more information reduces the marginal benefit of higher frequency. Observe that 
demand, profit and welfare are not very sensitive to the assumed time values. These 
observations hold under all regulatory settings considered. In terms of the comparison 
between regulatory settings, we see that the difference between fare regulation only and 
fare plus information regulation becomes quite small at low time values. The latter case 
yields just a bit more information and lower frequency. Finally, as argued above, the 
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relative rankings of different market structures are not affected by the assumed time 
values.   
 
 No regulation: 
Profit Max 
Fare regulation Fare and 
information 
regulation 
Social optimum 
   L        B      H   L        B      H   L        B      H   L        B      H 
Fare (p) 9.57   9.46  9.41 4.25   4.31  4.26 4.24   3.97  3.89 2.76  2.74  2.72 
Headway (h) 2.59   2.90  3.56 4.02   4.69  5.36 4.08   5.50  5.67 1.93  2.04  2.67 
Information 
(I) 
0.53   1.27  1.65 0.52   1.09  1.28 0.60   1.86  2.00 0.54  1.36  1.96  
Fraction of 
people 
planning ( ) 
0.24   0.77   0.99 0.34   0.87  0.99 0.39   0.98  0.99 0.18  0.67  0.98 
Demand (N) 0.96   0.95   0.94 1.45  1.41  1.41 1.45  1.46  1.47 1.66   1.64  1.63 
Profit  8.35   8.11   8.03 5.61  5.54  5.48 5.61  5.09  4.96 3.52   3.34  3.32 
Welfare 14.6  14.2  14.1 17.1  16.7  16.5 17.2  16.8  16.7 18.0  17.5 17.3 
Table 4. Sensitivity with respect to value of time. L: low (0.4), B: base (0.8), H: high 
(1.6) 
 
 
As a second illustration, let us look at the implications of changing the cost of 
operating the bus service
20
. Results are in Table 5. Higher costs of operating buses 
strongly reduces frequency under all market structures. This induces more people to plan, 
so that it becomes beneficial for the firm to offer more information. Note that there is 
almost no effect of higher operating cost on the fare; this is due to the fact that the cost of 
bus service is independent of the number of passengers. Finally, demand, profit and 
welfare all slightly go down.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Although we did not do a fully comprehensive sensitivity analysis, the results of varying some other 
parameters (for example, the price sensitivity of demand) are also available. For the limited set of 
parameter values that were used, the rankings of the various policy variables for the four cases studied was 
not affected.    
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 Profit Max Fare regulation Fare and 
information 
regulation 
Social optimum 
   L        B      H   L        B      H   L        B      H   L        B      H 
Fare (p) 9.62   9.46  9.30 4.15   4.31  4.46 4.14   3.97  4.15 2.77  2.74  2.70 
Headway (h) 1.59   2.90  4.90 2.62   4.69  7.25 2.75   5.50  7.74 1.06  2.04  3.61 
Information 
(I) 
0.72   1.27  1.55 0.71   1.09  1.25 0.83   1.86  1.96 0.72  1.36  1.81  
Fraction of 
people 
planning ( ) 
0.37   0.77   0.95 0.52   0.87  0.97 0.60   0.98  0.99 0.28  0.67  0.93 
Demand (N) 0.96   0.95   0.93 1.47  1.41  1.36 1.47  1.46  1.41 1.66   1.64  1.62 
Profit  8.57   8.11   7.59 5.66  5.54  5.36 5.65  5.09  4.95 3.70   3.34  2.94 
Welfare 14.9  14.2   13.4 17.5  16.7  15.7 17.6  16.8  15.9 18.3   17.5  16.7 
Table 5. Sensitivity to the cost of bus operations. L: low (1), B: base (2), H: high (4) 
 
 
Jointly with the theoretical findings, the numerical illustration allows some 
modest policy implications. First, although delegating all decisions to a profit maximizing 
firm yields frequencies and provision of information that are close to the social optimum, 
large welfare losses result due to the high fare. Second, government regulation of the fare 
indeed leads to much lower fares, but it comes at a cost in terms of quality of service: the 
firm provides lower quality information and lower frequency compared to both the social 
optimum and the profit maximizing outcome. Fare regulation does perform well in terms 
of stimulating people to plan their trips. Third, information regulation may resolve the 
problem of low information provision by fare regulated firms, but it does so at the 
expense of lower frequency. The welfare improvement of imposing informational 
requirements on fare regulated firms may therefore be relatively small. 
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9. Summary and conclusions 
 
 We studied the interaction between pricing, frequency and the provision of 
information by public transport companies offering scheduled services under different 
regulatory regimes. We allowed for users who plan their trip and others who do not. The 
fraction of users who plan their trips was treated as endogenous and depended on the 
frequency of service offered by the firm and on the level of information provided. Several 
institutional settings were considered. We studied two cases of government regulation 
where the government agency acts as the leader in a leader-follower game. In the first 
case, the agency regulated the fare and the firm decided on frequency and information 
provision. In a second situation we also studied fare plus information regulation by the 
government agency. Finally, for purposes of comparison we analyzed fares, frequencies 
and information provision for a profit maximizing firm deciding on all decision variables, 
and the case of a welfare maximizing government agency controlling all policy variables.  
Our theoretical findings include the following. First, conditional on the fare 
imposed, a fare-regulated firm will provide less frequency and less information compared 
to the welfare optimum. If information and frequency did not affect the number of 
planning users, then a higher regulated fare always induces the firm to raise both 
frequency and information provision. However, this is no longer necessarily the case 
once one accounts for an endogenous number of people planning their trips. If providing 
more information is very effective in reducing planning cost, increasing the regulated fare 
may in fact reduce frequency. Similarly, a higher regulated fare may reduce information 
provision if people attach a high value to waiting time, so that offering more frequency is 
much more effective at reducing the generalized cost of trips. Moreover, we show that the 
firm puts more emphasis on providing more information relative to raising frequency if 
more people plan their trips. Second, a fare-regulated firm may well provide lower 
quality information to passengers than a profit maximizing unregulated firm. Third, fare 
plus information regulation results in provision of high quality information, but it induces 
the firm to reduce frequency of service. As a consequence, the welfare improvement due 
to imposing information requirements on fare-regulated firms is limited. Fourth, the 
numerical illustration suggests that delegating all decisions to a profit maximizing firm 
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yields frequencies and provision of information that are close to the social optimum, but 
large welfare losses still result due to the high fare. Finally, of all institutional structures 
considered, socially optimal fares and service qualities stimulate passengers least to plan 
their trips: the high frequency offered under the socially optimal policy reduces the 
benefits of trip planning.  
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the aggregate demand for trips 
We assume travelers differ only in their individual planning efficiency  ; 
otherwise, they are identical. Moreover, we assume that individual demand is linear in the 
generalized price P of a trip. This will substantially simplify the aggregate demand 
function without affecting the qualitative results
21
. Specifically, let individual demand be 
given by 
a bP
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This implies demand is linear in  ( , )p f I h , where  
( , )
2
( , ) 1 ( , ) ( , ) ( )
2 2
h
k I
h h
f h I h k I I d


 
     

  
     
  
     
                                                 
21
 In principle, individual demand functions can be allowed to differ between individuals (i.e., that can be 
made dependent on the individual‟s type, indexed by  . More specifically, it is easy to show that the result 
shown below (viz. that aggregate demand can be written as a linear function of the expected generalized 
price) still holds when demand functions differ in intercept ( a ) but have a common slope (b). Allowing 
the slope parameter to be individual-specific complicates the technical analysis dramatically.    
 39 
The function f(h,I) captures the expected non-monetary component of generalized cost; it 
consists of the schedule delay cost, waiting time costs (for non-planning users) and 
expected planning (for people planning their trips) cost. In other words, expected demand 
for trips is linear in the expected generalized price. Reflecting linearity in  ( , )p f I h , in 
the main body of the paper we formulate demand as  ( , )N p f I h  with N’<0, N”=0.  
 
Appendix 2: Derivation of the impact of the fare on headway and information 
provision 
In this appendix, we derive the effect of the regulated fare on headway and 
information provided by the firm. We first derive general expressions for these effects, 
then look at some special cases and, finally, we elaborate and interpret the general case.  
 
Derivation of the general case 
We derive the effect of an exogenous increase in the regulated fare on the public 
transport firm‟s optimal choice of headway and quality of information provided to 
potential passengers. To derive these effects, differentiate the first-order conditions with 
respect to optimal headway and information quality (18b)-(18c) and write the result in 
matrix notation as: 
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and 
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Using Cramer‟s rule, the effect of a price increase on the optimal headway and on 
optimal information investment is, therefore: 
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where
hh II hI IhD      . The second order conditions to the firm‟s optimization 
problem imply  
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Straightforward algebra, using expressions (A2.1-A2.2) in (A2.3) and (A2.4), then 
leads to 
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2 3
' 2
'
dI N f f f f c f
pN
dp D h I h h I h I
         
       
          
    (A2.6) 
The first derivatives of the planning and scheduling cost function f(h,I) have been derived 
above, see (12). Differentiating (12) leads to  
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I I



 
 




 
      
 
  
   
  

 
 
 
   
 
 
 (A2.7) 
The signs of the first two expressions of (A2.7) follow from expression (1) in the main 
body of the paper. The sign of the final expression is ambiguous in general. The first term 
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on the right hand side is negative but, plausibly assuming 
, ( , )I I I  >0, the second one is 
positive.  
 The signs of the impacts of the regulated fare on headway and information (see 
(A2.5)-(A2.6)) are unambiguous, and depend on the various parameters of the model 
(time value, demand sensitivity, cost of operating buses, the effect of information on 
individual planning cost, etc.). It will be instructive, therefore, to start with some special 
cases.  
 
 Some special cases 
First, let us consider the case where ( , )
2
h
k I

   so that no one plans. In that 
case the average cost of planning users is zero, and 0  . This implies that (11) reduces 
to  
( , )
2
h
f h I h

   
We then have  
2 2 2
2 2
; 0; 0
2
f f f f f
h I I I h h


    
     
     
 
Substituting in (A2.5)-(A2.6) leads to   
 
'
" 0
2
dh N
g
dp D


   
     
   
               
0
dI
dp
    
If no one plans, a higher price reduces headway (hence raises frequency) but does not 
have any effect on information.  
Alternatively, assume ( , )
2
h
k I

   so that everyone plans; then waiting time 
costs of un-planning users are zero and 1  . The planning plus scheduling cost 
function f(h,I) then reduces to  
( , ) ( , ) ( )f h I h I d


     


  
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It follows  
2 2 2
,2 2
; ( , ) ( ) 0; ( , ) ( ) 0; 0I I I
f f f f f
I d I d
h I I h h I
 
 
          
 
 
    
      
      
 
Substituting in (A2.5)-(A2.6) then finally yield: 
  ,
'
' ( , ) ( ) " 0I I
dh N
pN I d g
dp D


      


    
            
                
3
' 2
( , ) ( ) 0I
dI N c
I d
dp D h


    


    
          
  
where the signs follow from ,0; 0I I I   . We again find that a higher fare reduces 
headway (raises frequency). Moreover, it raises information provision.  
 
Interpreting the general case 
 To facilitate the interpretation of the case with endogenous number of people  
planning their trips, assume that the individual planning cost function ( , )I  is linear, so 
that , I  are both constant. Note that under these assumptions it follows from (12) that  
 
( , )
2
( )
h
k I
I I
f
d
I


    


  
 
 
Using the first (see (12)) and second derivatives (see (A2.7)) of the cost function f(.) it is 
then easily shown that: 
22 2
2
2 2
2
( )
2
2 2
I
I
f f f f
I h I h I
f f f f
h I h h I



 

 
 

      
     
       
      
     
       
 
Substituting in (A2.5)-(A2.6) and using (9) we find after simple manipulations 
 
'
" (1 )
2
dh N
g Z
dp D I


  
     
  
    
 3
' 2
I
dI N c
Z
dp D h I

 
  
   
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where  
  ' 0
2
IZ pN

 
  
    
  
 
  
Appendix 3. The effect of the cost of operating buses on headway and information 
The impact of increasing the cost of operating a bus on the optimal headway is 
given by, using (A2.1)-(A2.2) 
  
1
hc II
dh
dc D
         
We know 0II   by the second order condition and 0hc   by (A2.2). Hence  
0
dh
dc
  
The effect on information provision is:  
  
2
2
1 1 1
'hc hI
dI f
p N
dc D D h h I
 
   
    
    
    
As 
2 f
h I

 
<0 (see (A2.7)), for linear demand more costly bus operations raise the level of 
information provided to passengers.   
 
